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Walter J. Ong, S.J.
A Retrospective
Paul A. Soukup, S. J.
Managing editor, Communication Research Trends
psoukup@scu.edu

Communication Research Trends usually charts current communication research, introducing its
readers to recent developments across the range of inquiry into communication. This issue, however, takes
a different tack, looking back on the writings of Walter J. Ong, S.J., who died at the age of 90 in August
2003. Ong spent his scholarly career at Saint Louis University, where he served as University Professor of
Humanities, the William E. Haren Professor of English, and Professor of Humanities in Psychiatry at the
Saint Louis University School of Medicine. In a career that spanned 60 years, Ong published 16 books,
245 articles, and 108 reviews. In addition, he edited a number of works and gave interviews that further
explored his wide-ranging interests. Readers interested in a full bibliography of Ong’s works should refer
to the web site prepared by Professor Betty Youngkin at the University of Dayton, at
http://homepages.udayton.edu/~youngkin/biblio.htm.
From the perspective of an interest in connections among many areas of human knowledge over such
a long career, he explored a whole gamut of activities by careful observations of the threads that run
through western culture and by insightful analysis of what he observed. Communication forms one of those
many threads in the West—perhaps the dominant one—and so it occupies a similar place in Ong’s work.
The tapestry Ong weaves has, bit by bit, influenced thinking about communication as well as research. And
so, Communication Research Trends looks back on the writings of Walter Ong, S.J.

Walter J. Ong, S.J.
Perhaps surprisingly for someone with academic
preparation in Classics (B.A, Rockhurst College,
1933), Philosophy (Licentiate, Saint Louis University,
1941), Theology, (Licentiate, Saint Louis University,
1948), and English (M.A., Saint Louis University,
1941; Ph.D., Harvard, 1954), Walter Ong showed an
early understanding of the power of mass communication. One of the few to review Marshall McLuhan’s
1951 work, The Mechanical Bride: The Folklore of
Industrial Man, Ong (1952) recognized, with McLuhan
(his M.A. thesis adviser), that advertising and popular
communication provide an insight into contemporary
culture. He also recognized the ways that communication technologies had linked the entire world. This
early sensitivity to topics related to communication
runs through his entire career.

COMMUNICATION RESEARCH TRENDS

Farrell (2000) has already provided a detailed
introduction to Ong’s work, paying particular attention
to his literary criticism, media studies, and psychological explorations. Interested readers may consult that
work for biographical details as well as for information
regarding other key themes in Ong’s writings: literary,
psychological, pedagogical, and so on.
Though difficult to isolate completely, Ong’s contributions to communication studies fall into five general groupings: historical studies of rhetoric; visual
images and habits of thought—what Ong terms, “visualism”; the word; stages of communication media
(oral, literate, and electronic); and digital media and
hermeneutics. Though one might argue that his pedagogical and psychological themes also touch on communication, this retrospective will examine them only
in terms of the former topics.
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1. Historical Studies of Rhetoric
Ong’s Harvard graduate work (1948-1954)
focused on the 16th century Paris arts professor and
educational reformer Peter Ramus (1515-1572). In
Ong’s hands, Ramus and Ramism open windows first
onto the system of western education, then onto intellectual history, and finally onto human development. A
significant part of those histories is the history of rhetoric. Ong’s work fills in part of the gap between the
classical rhetoric of Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian,
for example, and the 18th century efforts of Hugh Blair
and others. The story appears embedded within the history of western pedagogy, since rhetoric fairly defined
educational preparation in the Middle Ages and
Renaissance (Ong, 1971c).
The study of Ramus plays a central role in Ong’s
thinking about communication, one that extends far
beyond the history of rhetoric. From classical times
through the Renaissance, rhetoric defined not only how
people spoke, but how people analyzed and solved
problems. In many ways, because rhetoric more or less
defined education, it defined, through education, the
dominant ways of thinking. Several changes occurred
shortly before or during Ramus’s lifetime. Ong noticed
two key changes in western thought, manifest in
Ramus’s writing: a shift away from rhetoric (with its
emphasis on probable knowledge) to logic (with its
emphasis on proofs and truth); and a shift from hearing spoken argumentation to seeing a written demonstration. And Ong also noticed how printing changed
the school environment. It was here that Ong first made
the connection between communication form (hearing,
seeing), communication media, and thought processes.
Much of his later work bearing on communication
explicates this initial insight.
In Ong’s study, Ramus plays a three-fold role in
the history of rhetoric. First, he more or less makes permanent the dismantling of rhetoric and the transfer of
key elements of classical rhetoric to the province of
dialectic. Second, he reinforces an emphasis on method
that will continue the impoverishment of rhetoric in
favor of dialectic. Third, he influences the teaching of
rhetoric and dialectic throughout western Europe
through the widespread popularity of his books. To
understand Ong’s later work, we must explore something of its origins in the history of rhetoric and the
career of Peter Ramus.
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A. Ramus and rhetoric
Rhetoric refers to oral expression and a preparatory analysis of issues for discussion or debate. But
systematic teaching about rhetoric did not begin until
people could write texts about it. And so, though the
study and teaching of rhetoric depends in some ways
on writing, writing itself appeared subordinate to oral
expression in the educational experience of the Middle
Ages and the Renaissance. “From antiquity through the
Renaissance and to the beginnings of romanticism,
under all teaching about the art of verbal expression
there lies the more or less dominant supposition that
the paradigm of all expression is the oration” (Ong,
1971c, p. 3). This pre-eminence of the spoken word
found reinforcement both from the goals of the educational establishment (to train political and ecclesiastical
leaders and teachers) and from the method of instruction (lecture and debate). But, as in all human enterprises, education itself redefined its subject. In the case
of rhetoric, much of this redefinition had to do with the
relation of rhetoric to logic or dialectic—methods of
proof (Ong, 1971b, p. 81).
Ong offers an overview of the educational milieu
that saw the development of Ramism and its transformation of rhetoric.
The more or less traditional five parts of rhetoric
commonly adhered to by non-Ramist
Renaissance textbook writers—invention, disposition, memory, striking expression (elocutio),
and delivery—date from ancient Greek times.
They were not five abstract parts of an abstract
art then, but five activities in which an aspirant
was disciplined so that he might become an orator or public lecturer—the common ideal of all
ancient liberal education. In antiquity a boy was
given a foundation of general information on all
possible subjects (inventio). He was taught to
use this material in composition (dispositio), his
mnemonic skill was developed (memoria),
together with his literary style (elocutio) and his
oral delivery (pronuntiatio). These five activities
added up to a rather complete educational program extending over a good number of years. As
a training which the normal educated man
received, these activities today would be called
simply education, or perhaps general education.
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. . . it was quite different in medieval and
Renaissance Europe. Rhetoric, which in ancient
times had been general culture purveyed in the
vernacular, was now culture set within a foreign
tongue; ... Rhetoric thus became chiefly a course
in Latin. (Ong, 1958a, p. 275)

The education system, with its need to teach Latin
grammar as well as subject matter, offered an opportunity for Ramus to combine and simplify the curriculum. Part of this took place in a changed understanding
of dialectic or logic.
In tracing the run-up to Ramism, Ong notes how
medieval Scholasticism had begun to develop logic in
a more formal way, splitting it off from any relationship with rhetoric (1958a, p. 53). In some ways, this
marked a kind of swing of the pendulum:
The relationship between rhetoric and logic over
the ages has been partly reinforcing and partly
competitive. Rhetoric overshadowed logic in the
patristic age, yielded to it more or less in the
Middle Ages (though rather less than even scholarly mythology today commonly assumes), and
overshadowed it again in a different way in the
Renaissance. (1971c, p. 7).

Throughout this history rhetoric referred to oral composition (from finding arguments to presenting them),
while Cicero’s companion art of dialectic (termed ars
disserendi in the West) became more identified with
logic (Ong, 1971d, p. 67). Gradually, people came to
regard rhetoric as a kind of lesser art, good for reasoning with probabilities; logic, as scientific or mathematical reason, grew in relative importance.
In Ramus’s day, Peter of Spain’s Summulae logicales formed the standard text. Since medieval students
consisted of teenaged boys, the treatment simplified and
introduced dialectic/logic, covering “propositions, the
predicables, the predicaments, syllogisms, the topics or
places, and fallacies.” Other tracts addressed “supposition..., relative terms..., extension..., appellation...,
restriction..., distribution..., and perhaps exponibles”
(1958a, pp. 56-57). What the boys received, then, was a
quick introduction to a kind of grammatical logic.
Though Peter of Spain at first “seems to be in the
Aristotelian tradition of dialectical or rhetorical argumentation” (dealing with probable argument and probable conclusion), he quickly moves to conviction,
addressing the truth claims of questions (p. 61). In his
manual for logic, Peter of Spain leaves behind
Aristotle’s understanding “of dialectic as a rational
structure, more or less involved in dialogue between
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persons, made up of probabilities only” (p. 61) for an
insistence on proof. Eventually he ends with a formalistic logic, applied with almost mathematical precision.
The next stage in the history of rhetoric and
dialectic occurred with Rudolph Agricola’s Dialectical
Invention in Three Books. Agricola more or less
defined dialectic for the Renaissance, presenting less
an emphasis on the scientific reasoning demanded by
teachers and more an emphasis on a “real-world” quality that would appeal to students and to the growing
number of scholars associated with the humanist movement (p. 97). Agricola developed materials from
Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and other classical
sources, but simplified terms. Dialectic works through
speech, and so Agricola devotes his second book to the
oration (p. 98). Book III continues with the effects and
styles of speech. By now the art of discourse finds its
home in textbooks of dialectic rather than rhetoric;
rhetoric even loses its claims to invention and to a key
part of invention, the “places” (loci) or topics that
helped the speaker find out what to say (pp. 101-102).
This limitation of loci to dialectic is the critical
Renaissance divorce in the chronologically
uneasy union of rhetoric and dialectic. Agricola
decrees this divorce, which will carry through
Ramism. (1958a, p. 102)

The loci or places take on huge importance in
Agricola and later in Ramus. They begin as headings or
topics under which one can develop arguments. Here is
Agricola’s definition:
These things, common in that since they contain
within themselves whatever can be said on any
matter, they thus contain all arguments, were
called by these men places (loci), because all the
instruments for establishing conviction are located within them as in a receptacle or a treasure
chest. A place (locus) is thus nothing other than a
certain common distinctive note of a thing, by the
help of which it is possible to discover what can
be proven (or what is probable) with regard to
any particular thing. (qtd. in Ong, 1958a, p. 118)

Ong points out that this concept of the loci does not
address any kind of theory of cognition or epistemology; instead it relies on a visual analogy. The development of such thought ultimately established graphical
representation of thought categories firmly in western
civilization.
The transfer of the loci to dialectic also further
weakened rhetoric, for no longer did those educated in
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this tradition—a tradition that had a huge impact on
Ramus and, through him, on western Europe—look to
rhetoric for invention. “This implied spread of dialectic to cover all discourse is made fully explicit by
Agricola in his assertion that ‘there are no places of
invention proper to rhetoric’ “ (1958a, p. 101). Ramus
eventually completed the move by calling these places
(loci) “arguments” (p. 105).
Ramus also highlighted and developed Agricola’s
use of charts or visual aids to represent the places.
While neither man was the first to do this, the printeror book-friendly nature of the charts made Ramus’s use
extraordinarily influential. But the use of visual representation for cognitive categories had a greater effect,
which Ong describes as a conflict between visual and
auditory means of knowing, a conflict manifest in the
shift to logic/dialectic (and its visual places) from rhetoric with its emphasis on speaking. Dialectic, in
Ramus’s hands, emphasizes invention, removed as it
was from rhetoric.
The reason for the difficulties which these two
concepts [invention, judgment] present is that
they are not traceable to two such clear-cut steps
in cognition, but rather to two different ways of
approaching the cognitive process. Invention
sees it in terms of an analogy with a high visual
and spatial component: one looks for things in
order to find them; one comes upon them (invenio, ευρισκω). This notion is allied to the
Greek (and Latin) concept of knowledge and
understanding, based on some sort of analogy
with vision (γιγνωσκω, intelligere). Judgment
cannot be readily interpreted in terms of such an
analogy; it is connected with judicial procedure
(and thus with the categories or “accusations”),
and suggests the Hebraic concept of knowledge
(yadha‘), which is analogous to hearing. The
presence of these two items at the very center of
the traditional account of the operations of the
mind thus confirms . . . that any attempt to deal
somewhat fully with the intellectual processes
must rely on analogies between understanding
and hearing as well as between understanding
and seeing. (1958a, p. 114)

In many ways the history and relationship of these two
ideas forms the central insight that grounds all of Ong’s
work. His later studies flesh out how humans define
knowledge and how they develop tools to convey
knowledge, particularly communication tools.
Aristotle’s sense of human knowledge involves
speaking. “Human knowledge for Aristotle exists in the
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full sense only in the enunciation, either interior or
exteriorized in language; the saying of something about
something, the uttering of a statement, the expression
of a judgment” (p. 108). Agricola and Ramus, in contrast, concentrated on visual maps. And this visualism
reinforced the proof-oriented logic of Peter of Spain.
Ramus himself developed this as a method, “which
consists of trying to impose upon the whole axiomatic
tradition of scholastic philosophy the pattern of a logic
of topical invention” (p. 130). And that emphasis fit
nicely with pedagogical practices, printed texts, and the
need for a scientific method that would eventually
serve to guarantee knowledge.
Ramus was above all a teacher and that shaped
his approach to developing both his dialectic and his
rhetoric in an age when printing changed the school
environment. He lived at a time when science also
changed the learning environment. His was a time that
witnessed “a movement away from a concept of
knowledge as it had been enveloped in disputation and
teaching (both forms of dialogue belonging to a personalist, existentialist world of sound) toward a concept of knowledge which associated it with a silent
object world, conceived in visualist, diagrammatic
terms” (p. 151).
His dialectic, like that of Agricola, focused on
finding terms (invention) and recasting judgment as
“the doctrine of collocating (or assembling) what
invention has found, and of judging by this collocation
concerning the matter under consideration” (qtd. in
Ong, 1958a, p. 184). The collocation (as the word
implies) stresses arrangement, again a visual move.

B. Ramus and method
In tracing the history of “method” Ong reminds
the modern reader that in its original Greek use, by the
second century Hellenic rhetorician Hermogenes,
method “means something more like mode of rhetorical organization or thought structure” or even “pattern”
rather than Aristotle’s “systematic investigation” (p.
231). The approach made its way through the humanists to the schools, where Ramus eventually found
Johann Sturm and Philip Melanchthon using it in their
logics. In these instances, method is associated with
language rather than science. The part of method that
underwent greatest development in Ramus is the logical process of invention through the division of definitions into their parts (p. 233).
Ramus proposed a whole series of methods—
things that have universal applicability. In general, his
laws of method feature subsequent definitions and divi-
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sions, resulting in a nearly binary chart of breaking
concepts down into smaller and smaller parts. With this
almost mechanical technique of invention, and with the
emphasis on visualization that such a technique supports, what is left for rhetoric?
Given his desire to sort things out clearly, Ramus
removed anything from rhetoric that appeared elsewhere in his syllabus. Where Aristotle and Cicero had
set up parallel structures for rhetoric and dialectic,
depending on the nature of their objects, Ramus drew a
strict division. Since invention and disposition (judgment) are already treated in dialectic, they cannot have
a place in rhetoric. In Ramus’s treatment, rhetoric can
claim only elocution and pronunciation. “The fifth part,
memory, is simply liquidated by being identified with
judgment” (p. 270). Much of the Ramist reform of rhetoric, then, resulted from the demands of his teaching.
Ong recognizes the larger implications of
Ramus’s dual stress on visual organization and simplification.
In this economy where everything having to do
with speech tends to be in one way or another
metamorphosed in terms of structure and vision,
the rhetorical approach to life . . . is sealed off
into a cul-de-sac. The attitude toward speech has
changed. Speech is no longer a medium in which
the human mind and sensibility lives. It is resented, rather, as an accretion to thought, hereupon
imagined as ranging noiseless concepts or
“ideas” in a silent field of mental space. . . .
Thought becomes a private, or even an antisocial

enterprise. The sequels of Ramism—method and
its epiphenomena, which identify Ramism as an
important symptom of man’s changing relationship to the universe—connect with Ramist
dialectic directly but with rhetoric only negatively or not at all. (1958a, p. 291).

Ramus’s rearrangement of dialectic and rhetoric both
indicate what happened in the educational world of the
16th century and added force to those happenings.

C. Ramus and printing
The spread of Ramism forms the third pillar supporting Ramus’s effect on the history of rhetoric. The
impact of his work lies precisely in its popularity. In
both the last part of his book on Ramus and in its companion volume (1958b), Ong traces “the diffusion of
Ramism” through the humanist publishers. In a word,
Ramus became a publishing phenomenon, the author
of educational best sellers.
Because of its school-text approach, Ramus’s
method proved highly successful, not only in Paris,
where Ramus led the Collège de Presles and also
served as dean of the regius professors at Paris. His
writings spread through continental Europe and
England, where he influenced several generations of
teachers from the Tudor period (1971d, pp. 81-89)
through John Milton (1608-1674) (Ong, 1982a). His
influence on the Puritans carried Ramism to New
England where his educational method and approach to
rhetoric appeared at Harvard University in the 17th and
18th centuries.

2. Habits of thought, representing knowledge, and visualism
In tracing the history of dialectic and rhetoric,
Ong remarks more than once that rhetoric shaped the
ways that people thought. Generation after generation
of young boys learned from classical texts where to
find ideas, and they imitated the models of expression
and analysis they found in the classical texts. However,
even as they thought they were doing the same thing as
Cicero, they adapted to a world that had changed its
mental symbols. Ong finds these “shifts in symbolization and conceptualization observable in the physical
sciences”; they are related, he tells us, “to another
series of shifts in the ways of representing the field of
knowledge and intellectual activity itself” (Ong,
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1962b, p. 69). He does not claim a causal connection
but remarks on the growing emphasis on the visual,
found in Renaissance astronomy, mechanics, and
physics, as well as in the use of perspective in art and
architecture. This same emphasis appears in “the three
artes sermocinales, or arts of communication—grammar, rhetoric, and most particularly dialectic” (p. 69).
It is a movement “from a pole where knowledge is conceived of in terms of discourse and hearing and persons
to one where it is conceived of in terms of observation
and sight and objects” (p. 70).
The shift appears in different guises. In his history of Ramism, Ong had already identified one: the
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changing understanding of the commonplaces. In the
older rhetorical tradition, the commonplaces have two
primary senses. First, they are the “headings” under
which one sought knowledge about various topics.
“These headings implemented analysis of one’s subject: for a person, one might, by a kind of analytic
process, consider his family, descent, sex, age, education, and the like; or more generally, for all sorts of
things, one could look to definition, opposites, causes,
effects, related matters, and so on” (Ong, 1977f, p.
149). But commonplaces also referred to “a standard
brief disquisition or purple patch on any of hundreds or
thousands of given subjects—loyalty, treachery, brotherhood, theft, decadence . . . and so on; these prefabricated disquisitions were excerpted from one’s reading
or listening or worked up by oneself” (p. 150). Though
such passages were commonly written down in
medieval florilegia, Ong follows Havelock (1963) in
attributing them to a much more ancient oral tradition
that valued the flow of words and constantly recycled
sayings lest they be lost by forgetting.
By the Renaissance these collections had multiplied. They served a purpose in schools, where they
became handy compendia of Latin for schoolboys. The
Renaissance ambition to return to the classics also
meant that such collections increased their value. The
big change, though, is that such collections appeared in
texts and their pattern of recall no longer depended on
memory but on their visual arrangement on a page
(1977f, pp. 161-163). The rise of the printing press
transformed such collections by adding an index, by
arranging things artificially (for example, in alphabetical order), by laying things out on a page. Ong terms
this “visual retrieval” (p. 166) and shows how
Theodore Zwinger in his 1586 Theatrum humanae
vitae [Theater of Human Life] literally envisioned his
commonplace collection as “scenes.”
Zwinger thinks of the printed page as a map on
which knowledge itself is laid out. Over and
over again he compares his work to that of geographers and cartographers. (1977f, p. 174)

Ong judges Zwinger’s compilation of charts, whose ideas
are linked by typographic symbols “visually neat” but
“the result is so complicated as to be psychologically
quite unmanageable” (p. 176). Even if it were a failed
attempt, it demonstrates how thoroughly western thought
had shifted from oral arrangements to visual ones.
The rise of such visual organization occurs along
with other changes in the history of ideas. Among them
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Ong places the rise of a “system” as opposed to a
“method” of thought. After tracing the history of these
epistemological approaches through the medieval period and through the thickets of dialectic, he concludes:
With the method discussion at this point and the
visualist tide running strong, an important shift
took place in the whole notion of space, signalized if not caused by the publication of
Copernicus’s De revolutionibus in 1543. . .
Copernicus’s astronomy approaches the universe from the point of view of purely geometrical space, in which no direction was more
favored than any other, since neither up-anddown motion nor any other directional motion
had priority over other kinds, any more than it
does in a geometrical abstraction. (Ong, 1962b,
p. 80)

Copernicus’s understanding of the cosmos opened the
door for others to set aside notions of method, which
involved direction (literally, in Greek, “method” is
seeking a “way through” a problem, p. 82), and to
embrace instead a more abstract arrangement. Such
arrangements of “objects” in “space” almost presuppose the visual. Ong offers two comments:
Thinking of knowledge as governed by the diagrammatic, easily imagined, and only loosely
applicable notion of system was more satisfying
than thinking of it in terms of method and these
conundrums [of direction, end, finding a way in
unknown territory, etc.] . . .
The rise of the notion of system as applied to
the possessions of the mind is only one in a
whole kaleidoscope of phenomena which mark
the shift from the more vocal ancient world—
truly an audile’s world—to what has been called
the silent, colorless, and depersonalized
Newtonian universe. (1962b, p. 83)

The western habits of thought have become visual, disconnected from the voices and clamor of debate.
In a wonderful essay, “‘I See What You Say’:
Sense Analogues for Intellect” (1977b), Ong summarizes the effects of visualism on thinking, going so far
as to show its history in the vocabularies we use. As
with rhetoric, the way we talk reveals, in some ways,
the way we think. His list of visual words “used in
thinking of intellect and its work” includes “insight,
intuition, theory, idea, evidence, species, speculation,
suspicion, clear, make out, observe, represent, show,
explicate, analyze, discern, distinct, form, outline, plan,
field of knowledge, object” and many others. Aurally
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based terms, though greatly reduced, still exist. They
include “category, predicate, judgment, response” and
so on (pp. 133-134). The attention to the visual marks
a difference. “Because sight is thus keyed to surfaces,
when knowledge is likened to sight it becomes pretty
exclusively a matter of explanation or explication, a
laying out on a surface, perhaps in chart-like form, or
an unfolding, to present maximum exteriority” (p.
123). This, of course, stands in contrast to the interiority revealed by sound.
Ultimately, Ong tries to gather material from
throughout the western tradition. “I have also attempted to show how intimately this aural-to-visual shift is
tied in with educational procedures and with the transfer of verbalization from its initially oral-aural economy of sound to a more and more silent and spatialized
economy of alphabetic writing and of printing from
movable alphabetic type, which seems to assemble
words out of pre-existent parts, like houses out of
bricks” (p. 126).
Evidence for the increasingly visual quality of
knowing appears throughout the literary and pedagogi-

cal tradition of the West. Ong finds support in his study
of poetry, examining what happens to poems as writers
and readers adjust to texts. Where the oral and rhetorical
tradition addressed an audience (literally, hearers), “the
reader, using his eyes to assimilate a text, is essentially a
spectator, outside the action, however interested” (Ong,
1977c, p. 222). Where the live audience “knows”
through interaction in an open arena of discourse, the
reader experiences a kind of insulation. This fosters a
different kind of knowledge—more solitary, more
reflective, a “romantic feeling for isolation” (p. 223).
Ong hints here at a much larger project, one that
connects habits of thought not only with rhetoric but
with the technologies of communication. From the perspective of communication, Ong repeatedly calls attention to the difference between communicating
orally/aurally and visually. Though he highlights the
habits of thought aligned with each, we could equally
well read him as highlighting the media, something
that he does increasingly later on in his writings, and
something to which we will return in Part 4.

3. The Persistence of the word
Throughout his histories of rhetoric and in the
course of his sensitivity to visualism in intellectual history, Ong does not lose his ear for sound. Voice matters.

A. Voices and hearers
Ong refers to “the world of sound” and calls it
“the I-thou world where, through the mysterious interior resonance which sound best of all provides, persons
commune with persons, reaching one another’s interiors in a way in which one can never read the interior of
an ‘object’” (1962a, pp. 27-28). In addition to opening
up the interior, sound always signifies life. In a favorite
example, Ong reminds his readers that we can see an
elephant, touch an elephant, smell an elephant, or even
taste an elephant without worry. But if we hear an elephant, we’d better watch out (Ong, 1967, p. 112)!
Voice is not just any sound, though. While even
an animal cry signifies an interior condition, the human
voice is “an invasion of all the atmosphere which surrounds a being by that being’s interior state, and in the
case of man, it is an invasion by his own interior selfconsciousness” (1962a, p. 28). The interior cannot be
completely exteriorized, but verbal expression con-
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nects to a person’s interiority. “Language retains this
interiority because it, and the concepts which are born
with it, remain always the medium wherein persons
discover and renew their discovery that they are persons, that is, discover and renew their own proper interiority and selves” (p. 29). The voice giving voice to
words makes a claim on us.
Whether that voice occurs in first-person speaking or whether it appears as an authorial voice, a claim
occurs. The voice utters words, which both manifest
the interior and connect us to one another. “Every
human word implies not only the existence—at least in
the imagination—of another to whom the word is
uttered, but it also implies that the speaker has a kind
of otherness within himself” (Ong, 1962c, p. 52).
Because such words connect, they claim a relationship,
the I-thou which Ong mentioned earlier. Ong ponders
how this relationship can occur with literature and he
traces human relationships from the face-to-face,
through role playing in drama, to the voice that a reader hears. All exist within “a context of belief “—a connecting of one with another. Here, to specify that con-
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text of belief, Ong distinguishes “belief that” from
“belief in,” noting that voice promotes the latter. To put
this in more recognizable communication terms,
“belief that” refers to content, while “belief in” refers
to a relationship. Speaking and literature—indeed all
communication—occur within this context of “belief
in,” of making claims one upon another (pp. 55-57).
Without such an imitatively oral or face-to-face
context to connect interlocutors, written communication cannot succeed. Voice does summon belief. But
the process works both ways. Writers, too, must reach
out to readers, if only in imagination. The interactive—
live, interiority manifesting—nature of communication
is so central that the writer must create a voice and in
so doing, create an audience. Before one can write, one
must imagine an audience—hearers; that is, one must
re-create the role playing of voice calling on voice. In
fact, readers pick up the roles defined for them by writers, often “the role of a close companion of the writer”
(p. 63). Ong finds the roots of this technique in journalism. “With the help of print and the near instantaneousness implemented by electronic media (the telegraph first, later radio teletype and electronic transmission of photography), the newspaper writer could bring
his reader into his own on-the-spot experience, availing
himself in both sports and war of the male’s strong
sense of camaraderie based on shared hardships” (p.
67). Though Ong admits that “readers have had to be
trained gradually to play the game” (p. 67), he insists
that voice remains a part of all communication.
These explorations of sound, voice, word, and
interiority tease out more of the experience of communication. The spoken word of rhetoric differs from the
visual object; knowledge developed in each of these
cases differs one from the other. Ong has a sense that
more is going on with the word than he can quite
explain.

B. Word, sound, and the sensorium
By the early 1960s, Ong had come to know the
work of Eric Havelock (1963), Milman Parry (1928),
Albert Lord (1960), and Marshall McLuhan (1962).
Havelock describes the period as one of intense intellectual ferment for those concerned with language, oral
cultures, and thought (1986, p. 25). Not surprisingly,
many things fell into place for Ong. Each of these writers provided additional evidence for what Ong had
noticed abut the word. Havelock’s work on Greek philosophy (1963) argued that writing—the move from
oral forms to written ones—began a transformative
process in Greek thought, one that ultimately leads to
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Greek philosophy, to objective thought, and to the
kinds of analysis that reach a peak in Aristotle.
Parry’s and Lord’s investigations of the Homeric
question—how a bard could compose and recall works
the length of the Iliad or Odyssey without writing—discovered still more about oral patterns of thought. What
Ong had seen in rhetoric, Lord and Parry explored in
poetics. Both described patterns of thought and remembering associated with speaking.
McLuhan’s attempt to put the pieces together—
he drew on Ong’s Ramus work—showed some of the
ways in which the forms of communication shape its
content. In a kind of creative leap, McLuhan understood that both context and medium matter, an insight
he summed up in the now famous phrase, “the medium
is the message” (1964, p. 7). McLuhan pointed Ong
and others toward the recognition that our own forms
of communication (writing, for example) affect our
own thinking and perhaps in this way prevent us from
attending to oral thought.
Ong’s thinking about oral/aural communication
received new energy. His Terry Lectures at Yale, published in 1967 under the title, The Presence of the
Word, lay out a wide ranging meditation on the word,
both spoken and written.
Ong introduces here the idea of “the sensorium,”
the patterned, patterning, and coordinated world of
sense experience—the use of the human senses together to communicate (1967, p. 1). “By the sensorium we
mean here the entire sensory apparatus as an operational complex” (p. 6). Despite the fact that people
communicate by means of all the senses, the oral/aural
takes on special importance. In commenting on
Heidegger’s claim that language is rooted in a “primordial attunement of one human existent to another ...
in ‘speaking silence’,” Ong observes
All this is true, and in a certain sense commonplace, but it is noteworthy that when we thus
think of silence as communicating, we are likely
to think of it as a kind of speech rather than as a
kind of touch or taste or smell or vision—
”speaking silence,” we say. The reason is plain:
silence itself is conceived of by reference to
sound; it is sound’s polar opposite. Thus even
when we conceive of communication as a transaction more fundamental than speech, we still
conceive of it with reference to the world of
sound. . . (1967, pp. 2-3).

Acknowledging that different cultures organize the
sensorium differently, Ong reminds us that people must
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attend selectively to sense perception and that sound
has special properties (p. 6).
The spoken word has consequences that go
beyond simple communication. As we have seen, rhetoric, the art of oral thinking, is tied to cultural forms,
thought patterns, and human experience. But there is
more. The world of sound is a world of passing time.
“Sound is more real or existential than other sense
objects, despite the fact that it is also more evanescent”
(p. 111). A spoken word exists in time, passing out of
existence even as it is spoken (Ong, 1973/2002, p. 377).
Even with this, the spoken word seems more real to
people, especially as a source of power (1967, p. 114),
because sound and spoken word manifest interiors and
interiority (p. 117). They manifest a presence. Sound
unites us—it situates us in the middle of things (p. 128),
in contrast to contemplation which, as a visual activity,
removes us from the immediate world. Sound fosters
particular structures of personality. Here, Ong makes a
strong, though somewhat intuitive claim: “Personality
structure varies in accordance with variations in communications media and consequent variations in the
organization of the sensorium” (p. 131). He explains:
In a world dominated by sound impressions, the
individual is enveloped in a certain unpredictability. As has been seen, sound itself signals
that action is going on. Something is happening,
so you had better be alert. Sounds, moreover,
tend to assimilate themselves to voices....A world
of sounds thus tends to grow into a world of voices and of persons, those most unpredictable of all
creatures. Cultures given to auditory syntheses
have this background for anxieties, and for their
tendencies to animism. (1967, p. 131)

Sound not only characterizes a way of communicating
but also forms humans in response to it.
By calling attention to the sensorium, Ong also
reminds us that depending too much on vision impoverishes knowledge, leading people to discount what
knowledge comes through senses other than sight
(1977b, pp. 129-131). In fact, many mental processes
depend on sound.
To learn to think and understand, it is far more
necessary to be able to hear and talk than to be
able to see. This is a counterindication apparently denying primacy to sight in favor of hearing.
(1977b, p. 137).

Here, Ong argues that vision distances: we need separation in order to see. Intellectual knowledge follows
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the same dynamic: analysis is a taking apart. But we
also need to put together, which is the movement of
predication or judgment, both actions allied to speaking and to sound. Sound surrounds us, unites us, connects us to what we know (p. 138). Sound fosters the IThou knowledge typical of the knowledge of persons
in relationships (pp. 140-141).
Sound has religious overtones as well. In addition
to his reference to animism where things are alive with
sound, Ong also considers the Word of God in the
Judeo-Christian tradition. Though he does not undertake a full study, Ong suggests that attention to the verbal or sonic dimension of communication can aid theology. “An oral-aural theology of revelation through
the Word of God would entail an oral-aural theology of
the Trinity, which could explicate the ‘intersubjectivity’ of the three Persons in terms of communication conceived of as focused (analogously) in a world of sound
rather than a world of space and light” (1967, p. 180).
Or, again, “But because the human word is uttered at
the juncture where interior awareness and external
event meet and where, moreover, encounter between
person and person occurs at its most human depths, the
history of the word and thus of verbal media has rather
more immediate religious relevance than the history of
kingdoms and principalities” (p. 181). He also suggests
that secularization (or “desacralization”) has connections with the shift from oral communication to written. “The shift of focus from the spoken word and
habits of auditory synthesis to the alphabeticized written word and visual synthesis (actuality is measured by
picturability) devitalizes the universe, weakens the
sense of presence in man’s life-world, and in doing so
tends to render this world profane, to make it an
agglomeration of things” (p. 162).

C. Fighting words
Sound also brings a polemic element to the fore.
Ong had noted this in his initial work on Renaissance
pedagogy. Schools taught boys to fight—with words,
but to fight nonetheless. From oratorical debates to disputations to contests of words, education harnessed the
polemic spirit in students. For Ong, this shows yet
another manifestation of sound. The speaker is bound
up in a particular way with sound/speech. The simultaneity of it creates a kind of ego bond that the print
word does not. Print distances, allows some psychological space, even a little self-criticism, that speech
does not. And so, people fight over words. Many causes contribute to the polemic nature of human interac-
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tion, but that polemic shows up in styles of talk and
thought and even in the content of that talk.
Superficially, preoccupation with virtue and vice
can be interpreted as an index of the religiosity
of a culture, and it is frequently so interpreted,
particularly in studies of the European Middle
Ages. But from what we have seen it should be
apparent that the tendency to reduce all of
human experience, including patently nonmoral
areas such as the incidence of disease or of physical cataclysm to strongly outlined virtue-vice or
praise-blame categories can be due in great part
to the tendency in oral or residually oral cultures
to cast up accounts of actuality in terms of contests between individuals. (1967, p. 201)

Spoken words, sounds, situate people in the world in
combative ways.
But—and for Ong, this is a good thing—people
also fight with words. Words substitute for arms and
weapons. Talking means that physical fighting has not
started. In oral cultures, including the more oral parts
of contemporary culture, people compete with words in
contests ranging from “playing the dozens,” to swapping insults, to extemporizing a rap song.
In all of these things sounds/words matter. Sound
belongs to human life and helps to establish the human
life-world. Ong’s historical studies also indicate that
the human relation with words changes over time, as
seen in the shifting relationship of rhetoric and dialectic. But what else changes?

D. Stages of communication, stages of
consciousness
The historical evidence Ong follows in The
Presence of the Word reinforces his conviction that
human communication unfolds in stages. After an oral
stage, human cultures gradually adopt writing systems
(chirography or hand-writing first, then print). The history of the West shows a third stage—electronic communication (1967, p. 17). The stages build on one
another in such a way that oral habits do not disappear
as people learn to write (a phenomenon that Ong calls
“residual orality”), nor does writing disappear with the
advent of the radio or television.
Ong noticed parallels between these developments in human communication and the development
of consciousness. The modes of communication interact with the ways that culture shapes consciousness (or
at least shapes the pedagogical tools by which it shapes
consciousness). More than an acknowledgment that the
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styles or means of communication can influence
thought categories or cultural predispositions, this
claim indicates that communication itself develops
along with human consciousness. Ong imaginatively
plays with some parallels between this development in
human communication and the development of the
human psyche.
In a kind of McLuhanesque probing, he attempts
an exploration into Freudian psychology: Do the three
stages of media (oral, written, electronic) relate to
Freud’s psychosexual stages (oral, anal, genital)? He
finds enough parallels to remark that oral verbalization
and the flow of words matches “the oral psychosexual
state if we think in terms of permissiveness and lack of
constraint” (1967, p. 93). Writing, like anality, constrains. The electronic stage may be generative and
socially oriented (pp. 101-102). However, Ong honestly admits that the parallelisms do not always work. The
oral stage “fails in terms of assimilative activity” and
the direction of interiority (pp. 97-98). The parallels
also don’t work in terms of ontogenetic and phylogenetic relationships (p. 103). Despite this, Ong still feels
that there is something in common between psychological development and the development of communication capability.
He shifts to more solid ground as he explores the
development of consciousness as outlined in the work
of psychologist Erich Neumann (1949/1954). In
Neumann’s work, he found additional evidence of the
ways the human psyche “feels its relationship to the
surrounding world, to time, and to space” in different
historical epochs. “The experience of being human has
undergone a kind of sea-change” (Ong, 1977e, p. 44).
Contemporary humans live in largely artificial worlds,
not only cities and skyscrapers, but artificial worlds of
communication. Writing, Ong reminds us over and
over again, is a technology. As such, it separates us
from the word and in some ways from ourselves.
Speech is something natural and that “is why speech is
so closely involved with our personal identity and with
cultural identity, and why manipulation of the word
entails various kinds of alienation” (p. 22).
As writing and other communication technologies emerge, consciousness changes. Ong observed this
with the shifting fortunes of rhetoric and with the
observations of Havelock regarding the Greeks.
Revisiting medieval pedagogy in the light of
Neumann’s history of consciousness, Ong hypothesizes that “the modern state of consciousness could
never have come into being without Learned Latin,”
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that is the written Latin learned as second language in
grammar schools down to the 19th century.
If writing initially helped thought to separate
itself from the human life world so as to help
establish and manipulate abstract constructs,
Learned Latin would seemingly have helped at a
crucial period with special efficiency, for its commitment to writing is in a way total, as has been
seen: it does not merely use writing but is controlled by writing. Such a chirographically controlled language would appear to reduce to a new
minimum connections with sound and thereby
connections with the intimate human life world
in its interiority and darkness. (1977e, pp. 36-37)

The artificial quality of written Latin forces humans to
experience the world abstractly, in the more visual
terms Ong had identified. Writing—indeed all communication technology—implicates consciousness, both
the consciousness of individuals and the shared consciousness of cultures, as manifest in knowledge, science, and practices.
Technology is important in the history of the
word not merely exteriorly, as a kind of circulator of pre-existing materials, but interiorly, for it
transforms what can be said and what is said.
Since writing came into existence, the evolution
of the word and the evolution of consciousness
have been intimately tied in with technologies
and technological developments. Indeed, all
major advances in consciousness depend on
technological transformations and implementations of the word. (1977e, p. 42)

Contemporary communication media, Ong tells us,
make “possible thought processes inconceivable
before. The ‘media’ are more significantly within the
mind than outside it” (p. 46). The various communication technologies—writing, the alphabet, visual
images, even computers—produce new ways of thinking because they provide new tools to assist thinking
and they allow thinking to be recorded and even to
occur outside of the minds of individuals. We read the
thoughts of others and further them; we share knowledge; we have machines do routine analysis (p. 47).

E. Religious consequences
In studying the word and its immediacy, Ong calls
attention to the religious qualities of communication. As
he came to understand the stages of communication, he
applied that model to the religious realm as well.
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Early and medieval Christianity had produced a
theology (as a systematic reflection on belief) that presumed texts: the biblical text, the texts of Christian
writers, and so on. Ong, however, points out the highly
oral nature of this theology. The Bible itself features a
many-layered orality and these oral structures have
largely found their way into theology (Ong, 1969a, p.
469). Later, even medieval and Renaissance theology
used oral forms, inherited in and from the original
Latin forms in which they worked. Such forms also
produced the polemic quality of theology—a quality
much in evidence in the Reformation period (p. 477).
As theology became more print-based, it developed
new, less formulaic, and less agonistic formats. While
these print-based structures characterize theology
today, Ong predicts that more contemporary theology
will feature both an orality based on electronic communication and a wider interaction among disciplines,
led and expanded by the ease promoted by the same
electronic communication (pp. 479-480).
The same forces at work in the stages of communication affect worship as well. Most liturgical activity
arose in oral cultures and key characteristics of orality—formulas, mnemonic patterns, rhythmic movements—remain in worship (Ong, 1969b, pp. 480-481).
Ong argues that many of the problems in the mid-20th
century Roman Catholic liturgical reform stemmed
from the clash between this orality and the orality of
electronic media, a more intimate experience, in which
the audience (or the community at worship) act more
like readers than hearers (pp. 481-482). Sensitive to the
role of sound, Ong also calls attention to the polemic
and irenic alignments that enter into worship (p. 485).
Finally, he notes that liturgy will change or at least
adapt its oral inheritance as it touches on memory,
community, participation, and thought processes.
(Ong wrote extensively on religious topics
throughout his career. As in these essays, he applied to
the religious his observations on communication, psychological development, media, and so on. He also
acted as a particularly sensitive observer of the religious scene, much as he observed communication. A
collection of his more explicitly religious essays
appears in Faith and Contexts, Volumes 1 and 2, 1992.)
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4. Communication media, orality, literacy, and secondary orality
Ong’s work with Ramus and the history of rhetoric combined with his reading of Havelock, Parry,
Lord, and McLuhan sensitized him to communication
media, communication processes, and their effects on
human life and thought. But even before his readings
on oral cultures—as early as a 1960 College English
essay—he discerned a line leading from ancient Greece
to modern communications, traced through educational establishments.
From the time of ancient Greece, communication processes have always been at the center of
western education. Early academic study
focused on grammar, which gave birth to rhetoric. Rhetoric formed a matrix for dialectic and
logic, and all these conjointly help shape physics
and medicine, and ultimately modern science.
Through the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and
into the 19th century, education began with
grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic or logic, the
artes sermocinales or communication arts. (Ong,
1962d, p. 220)

The printing revolution of early modern Europe
(Eisenstein, 1979) definitively puts texts at the center of
the educational enterprise and for the several centuries
thereafter, up to our own, teachers and students wrestled
with texts. Rhetoric, as we have seen, had moved from
the spoken word to an attribute of written materials.
For Ong, the advent of new communication technologies will not remove communication from the curriculum but will have an effect.
Probably a great many things are stirring; but it
is certain that many of them can be summed up
by saying that we are leaving the Gutenberg era
behind us. As we move further into a technological civilization, we meet with abundant signs
that the relationship between the teacher and the
printed word and hence those between the
teacher and a large area of communication,
which included practically all of what we generally mean by “literature,” are no longer what
they used to be. These relationships were set up
in the Renaissance when a typographical civilization appeared, climaxing the intense development of a manuscript culture which had
marked the preceding Middle Ages. The present
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swing is to oral forms in communication, with
radio, television (oral in its commitments as
compared to typography), public address and
intercom systems, or voice recordings (to
replace or supplement shorthand, longhand, typing, or print). As a result of this swing, older
relationships are undergoing a profound, if not
often perceptible, realignment. (1962d, p. 221).

Here we see Ong laying out the pieces for his later construction of the relationships of oral and literate cultures, even marking the emergence of what he eventually terms “secondary orality” (Ong, 1971a, p. 296).
New forms of communication build on older forms but
each one affects the relationships afforded to human
interaction. Ong remarks on the move from the oral
teaching of Socrates to Plato’s written version, Cicero’s
later writing out his speeches to Augustine’s reading
aloud. The manuscript culture of the Middle Ages
“retained massive oral-aural commitments” (p. 222),
but print culture largely silenced the voice, though not
the heritage of eloquence (p. 223).
The 20th century introduced a paradox: “that a
society given so much to the use of diagrams and to the
maneuvering of objects in space . . . should at the same
time develop means of communication which specialize not in sight but in sound” (p. 224). Such an emphasis on sound acts to counterbalance the dominance of
the visual reinforced by printed texts. Though printed
texts will not disappear, the more human dimension of
sound cannot be suppressed.
In their whole trend, modern developments in
communications, while they have not slighted
the visual, have given more play to the oralaural, which a purely typographical culture had
reduced to a record minimum in human life. The
sequence of development running from silent
print through audiovisual telegraph to the completely aural radio is an obvious instance of
increasing aural dominance. Even television
belongs partially in this visual-to-aural series,
being only equivocally a regression to visualism.
For the visual element in television is severely
limited. . . . Silent television is hardly an engaging prospect. (1962d, p. 225).
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The re-emergence of the oral-aural marks out the
personalist element of contemporary culture. If sight
beholds surfaces and promotes objectivity, then sound
opens up the interior, both literally and figuratively (pp.
226-27). Ever the observer, Ong notes how such sensitivities emerge in philosophy, literature, advertising,
and teaching.

A. Oral cultures, literate cultures
For Ong, it is never enough to remark the alignments of communication or the connections among its
modalities. He tries to connect our awareness of communication to its academic study, to its uses, to its consequences. Orality and Literacy (1982b), perhaps his
most widely reprinted and translated work, attempts
precisely that kind of connection.
Orality and Literacy marks Ong’s most systematic treatment of words—both spoken and written. His
subtitle, “The technologizing of the word,” specifies
how humans use technology to preserve, extend, and
modify their words. And—in a crucial step—Ong also
shows how human thought patterns interact with the
way they use words. Not as concerned with matching
up the communication changes with psychological
stages of growth, he summarizes several decades of
research to more solidly connect thought patterns with
communication. The stages of communication media
appear clearly: oral communication in oral cultures;
writing in chirographic cultures; print in print-based
cultures; and various media in electronic cultures.
Returning to, and radically extending, some
themes of The Presence of the Word, Ong describes
oral cultures in terms of “Some psychodynamics of
orality” (his chapter title). Oral cultures dwell in sound
and in the power of sound. As members of writing cultures, we have trouble imagining this situation: to
understand, for example, the power of a name.
Chirographic and typographic folk tend to think
of names as labels, written or printed tags imaginatively affixed to an object named. Oral folk
have no sense of a name as a tag, for they have
no idea of a name as something that can be seen.
(1982b, p. 33)

Instead object and name cannot be separated.
Oral cultures depend on memory and recall. “You
know what you can recall” (p. 33). What people think
about depends, too, on such recall. And so, oral cultures must not only remember but organize things
through the patterns of recall. These include rhyme and
rhythm, movement, formulas, and sayings (p. 35). “In
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an oral culture, to think through something in non-formulaic, non-patterned, non-mnemonic terms, even if it
were possible, would be a waste of time, for such
thought, once worked through, could never be recovered with any effectiveness, as it could be with the aid
of writing” (p. 35).
The centrality of memory and recall shapes other
dynamics of orality. Its thought is additive, stringing
items together, and thus works with aggregates rather
than with the taking of things apart through analysis.
“Without a writing system, breaking up thought—that
is, analysis—is a high-risk procedure” (p. 39). It is too
easy to forget how things fit together. The necessity of
remembering, and of remembering in particular ways,
leads to a redundancy in oral expression: better to repeat
than to forget. Thus, oral cultures tend to be conservative, whether in expression, narrative, government, or
religion (pp. 41-42). Oral cultures emphasize participation or identification with narrative characters or the
objects of knowledge (p. 46). Everything appears in its
situation, since that is how memory works best (p. 49).
The need to remember leads to specifically oral
techniques, rituals of behavior and language. Rhetoric
is a way of knowing and a way of expressing and a way
of acting. Interaction is expected. Oral folk expect people to engage each other, but in predictable ways.
Primary orality fosters personality structures that
in certain ways are more communal and externalized, and less introspective than those common among literates. Oral communication unites
people in groups. (1982b, p. 69)

Such group emphasis appears in the narratives and stories of oral cultures. Key figures unite the group but
also help the recall of story. Much easier to remember
the many adventures of a single Odysseus than the
individual acts of 20 others (p. 70).
Writing and, later, print change this, though the
change appears gradually. It triggers, in Raymond
Williams’ wonderful title, “the long revolution” of literacy (1961). Writing allows distance, both literally
and figuratively. By processing thoughts through texts,
writing spans miles and centuries. But writing also
allows a psychological distance: one can see one’s
thoughts recorded and spread out, separate from oneself. Again, the chapter title gives the argument:
“Writing restructures consciousness” (Ong, 1982b, p.
78). Memory gives way to written records, though this
too occurs slowly. Neither Plato nor medieval English
law trusted writing: “Witnesses were prima facie more
credible than texts because they could be challenged
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and made to defend their statements, whereas texts
could not” (p. 96). But over time, people learned to
work with texts, to provide contexts and external guarantees, cross-references, and visual methods that outweighed the textual silences (pp. 99-101).
Writing has its own dynamic. Its distancing leads
to precision: one can polish sentences and one can be
concise, without the need for repetition. Writing allows
the writer to “eliminate inconsistencies . . ., to choose
between words, . . . [to] erase” (p. 104). “By separating
the knower from the known . . ., writing makes possible increasingly articulate introspectivity, opening the
psyche as never before not only to the external objective world quite distinct from itself but also to the interior self against whom the objective world is set” (p.
105). Pedagogical practice amplifies writing’s effect on
consciousness by teaching people to work with texts,
by fostering more analytic thought, and by holding out
the possibility of objectivity.
Ong is careful enough to warn against any reductionism here, but he does urge us to see the web of relations connected to writing.
Once writing is introduced into a culture and
grows to more than marginal status, it interacts
with noetic and social structures and practices
often in a bewildering variety of ways . . . .
Sooner or later, and often very quickly, literacy
affects marketing and manufacturing, agriculture
and stock-raising and the whole of economic life,
political structures and activities, religious life
and thought, family structures, social mobility,
modes of transportation (a literate communication system laid the straight Roman roads and
made the ancient Roman Empire . . .) And so on
ad infinitum. (Ong, 1986/1999, p. 155)

In “Writing Is a Technology That Restructures
Thought” (1986/1999), Ong spells out 14 consequences of writing’s separation or distancing. These
include, as we have seen, the separation of the knower
from the known, as well as data from interpretation,
word from sound, word from existence, past from present, administration from other social activities, academic learning from wisdom, logic from rhetoric,
social classes one from another, sound from sight, and
being from time (pp. 156-162).
Printing speeds the process along, both by increasing literacy (as more people have access to texts) and by
fostering greater visualism. “Writing moves words from
the sound world to a world of visual space, but print
locks words into position in this space” (1982b, p. 121).
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Printing leads to any number of changes in how people
deal with information—changes we largely take for
granted, but which appear revolutionary when compared to the information economy of oral cultures.
Printed texts foster the use of lists, material “abstracted
from the social situation in which it had been embedded
. . . and also from linguistic context” (p. 123). Such listings seem even stranger when they have no oral organization, but only one based on alphabetical order. The
fixity of print also promotes a particular kind of list—
the index—to guide readers to the fixed location of
information within a book.
The visualism of printed books promotes seeing
the book and its pages as labels, as illustrations of
knowledge (p. 126), something Ong had seen in the
books of Ramus with their graphically arrayed binary
arrangements of logic. Ong also connects this visualism to modern science. While observation was not new,
“what is distinctive of modern science is the conjuncture of exact observation and exact verbalization:
exactly worded descriptions of carefully observed
complex objects and processes” (p. 127). Where oral
cultures attend to action, visual ones focus on appearance. This bias of print supports science’s need to provide precise descriptions in ways that other scientists
could confirm. As a way of seeing, visualism leads to
more precise seeing. Ong finds additional evidence of
this visualism in post-print literature’s elaborate
descriptions and use of typography (pp. 127-128).
Other marks of modern society connect to print as
well. Print fostered a sense of language as something
written—dictionaries, grammars, “correct” expression
(p. 130). By supplying more books to readers, print
changed the relationship between readers and books.
First, it supported a sense of privacy (being alone with
a book, with no need to interact with others). Second,
it fostered a sense of ownership of words (copyrights,
for example). And print also changed the relationship
of readers with themselves. By treating words as things
on a visual surface, print led humans to think of the
their own consciousness as a kind of thing or mental
space (pp. 130-132).

B. Traces of older media
But it all happened slowly. While print changed
the information dynamics of human society, it did not
erase the oral. The same thing occurred with the advent
of writing. Comparing the oral Homeric epics to
Virgil’s written work, Ong notes, “But oral traits did
not by any means vanish in narrative immediately with
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the coming of writing. They tapered off gradually and
unevenly” (Ong, 1977a, p. 195). What evidence suggests oral habits lingering in western print culture, print
habits remaining in electronic culture? Ong highlights
two things. First, he comments on what he terms “oral
residue,” the oral modes of thought and expression that
appear in the writings of the generations new to print.
Second, he claims that electronic communication has
created a “literate orality,” an oral culture based on
print, what he terms a secondary orality. Both assertions seem almost self-evident, but Ong provides some
supporting evidence.
Oral residue occurs because people educated for
oral expression will use those expressions in their writing.
Manuscript and even typographic cultures . . .
sustain traces of oral culture, but they do so to
varying degrees. Generally speaking, literature
becomes itself slowly, and the closer in time a
literature is to an antecedent oral culture, the less
literary or “lettered” and the more oral-aural it
will be. (1971b, p. 25)

To demonstrate his point, Ong searches Tudor literature
for oral residue. He find it in particular in “the cult of
copia and of the commonplaces” (p. 27). Both come to
English literature from the rhetorical tradition. The former refers to an eloquence never at a loss for words, the
“rich flow, as well as ability, power, resources, or
means of doing things” by which speakers (and later
writers) manage language. It is the ability of an epic
poet to assemble volumes of material (pp. 33-35). Of
course, a writer need not marshal words in the same
way that an orator or bard does. In fact, highly developed writing avoids this kind of repetition, since writers know that readers can turn back and re-read material as necessary.
We have already seen the second oral residue, the
commonplaces, those ways of organizing material that
seem strange to us today, but which fairly well defined
the information handling of oral cultures. In another
essay, Ong suggests a third lingering oralism: the use of
epithets in the English epic poetry of Spenser and
Milton (1977a).
In addition to the oral residue marking print culture, orality also returns as secondary orality in postprint culture. Ong’s knowledge of the history of rhetoric attuned his ear to the similarities and differences
between contemporary speaking and the recorded
speech of earlier eras. Such secondary orality appears
not just in a more writerly speaking—the television
dialogue or speaking that depends on a script, for

COMMUNICATION RESEARCH TRENDS

example—but also in a speaking that unveils a changed
psyche.
If I may use terms which I fondly believe I have
originated, I would suggest that we speak of the
orality of preliterate man as primary orality and of
the orality of our electronic technologized culture
as secondary orality. Secondary orality is founded
on—though it departs from—the individualized
introversion of the age of writing, print, and
rationalism which intervened between it and primary orality and which remains as part of us.
History is deposited permanently, but not inalterably, as personality structure. (1971a, p. 285)

The strands and habits of these oralities do not disentangle easily. Following his usual approach, Ong examines them carefully, looking to one characteristic, in
this instance “the use of formulary devices” (p. 285).
The use of formulas appears constantly in primary orality—to describe, to store knowledge, to compose utterances, and so on. In fact, the works of Havelock, Parry,
and Lord spell out how ancient Greek culture depended on the use of formulas, especially in the Illiad and
Odyssey and how the formulas influenced Greek
thought.
Today’s electronic culture of radio and television
still uses formulas but in different ways. “The formulary device is no longer deeply grounded in practical living since it has now relatively limited use for knowledge storage and retrieval” (p. 296). Instead we use formulas as cliches or as starting points for analysis (p.
297). The formula appears as an advertising or political
slogan, as a catch phrase, as a jingle, almost as a label
(p. 299). And each of these in some ways resembles the
visual form, a connection with literacy, that belies the
oral and reminds us that secondary orality rests on the
psychological foundations, organizations, and habits of
writing.
Ong arrives at a similar conclusion from a different angle when he asks whether new media destroy
older media. Once again taking up an historical
approach, he remarks “some paradoxical laws”:
A new medium of verbal communication not
only does not wipe out the old, but actually reinforces the older medium or media. However, in
doing so it transforms the old, so that the old is
no longer what it used to be. Applied to books,
this means that in the foreseeable future there
will be more books than ever before but that
books will no longer be what books used to be.
(Ong, 1977d, pp. 82-83)
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People do not abandon communication media that
have successfully served them. But they often discover new ways to use the old. If Ong is correct that media
forms restructure (or at least influence) consciousness,
then new forms change people and how people think
to the extent that they can never pretend that the new
had not touched them. We have a complex cycle of
interaction, evolution, and transformation of communication media.
. . . part of the transformation is effected because
the new medium feeds back into the old medium
or media and makes them redolent of the new.
The conventionally produced book can now
sound to some degree like the orally programmed book [the transcription of a recorded
interview, for example].
Patterns of reinforcement and transformation
have existed from the very beginning in the verbal media. . . . When writing began, it certainly
did not wipe out talk. Writing is the product of
urbanization. It was produced by those in compact settlements who certainly talked more than
scattered folk in the countryside did. Once they
had writing they were encouraged to talk more,

if only because they had more to talk about.
But writing not only encouraged talk, it also
remade talk. Once writing had established
itself, talk was no longer what it used to be.
(1977d, p. 86)

Talk changes, not only because one could talk about
what was written—people no doubt talked about
Plato’s Dialogues just as we talk about the books on
best seller lists. Talk changed, too, by becoming more
literary. Orators could write out speeches to practice
them before delivering them. People could study textbooks on speaking, much as we do today.
New communication media change old media
and old media remain a part of newer media. The same
interaction, evolution, and transformation happens
with radio, television, and computers today. “A new
medium, finally, transforms not only the one which
immediately precedes it but often all of those which
preceded it all the way back to the beginning” (p. 90).
Our use of computers for instant messaging, for example, affects how we watch television, how we write,
and how we talk.

5. Digital communication, writing, and interpretation
A. Text
Digital or computer-based communication not
only transforms what precedes it, but calls attention to
specific aspects of textual communication. Digital
communication depends upon a specific code: it is
information—”a message transmitted by a code over a
channel through a receiving (decoding) device to a particular destination.” But this code is not itself communication, since communication requires “the exchange
of meanings between individuals through a common
system of symbols” (Ong, 1996, p. 3). The latter, however, makes use of the former. The awareness of this
dependence of communication on information leads to
a further awareness, that “all text is pretext” (Ong,
1990/2002, p. 497).
A text, Ong writes, “is not fully a text until someone reads it, that is, until someone produces from the
writer’s text something nontextual, a sequence of
sounds” (p. 497). But in order to read a text, the reader must know the code used to write the text. This
dependence on reading reminds us, who have most
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likely overlooked or forgotten the fact, that “text as
text is part of discourse” (p. 497). Discourse, interaction between people, somehow gets suspended in a text
“until a reader chances along” (p. 498).
And discourse requires the presence of the word,
of a dialogue, of people. Ong defines “the basic sense
of presence” as a “person-to-person relationship, not
thought-to-word-to-thing relationship” (p. 498). Texts
manage both to facilitate and to get in the way of these
relationships. They interpose themselves and need
decoding, but they also allow readers to enter into relationships with long-dead writers.
This absence calls for fictionalizing. Someone has
to play a role: writer or reader or both. And since
the reader has to be alive to read, his or her roles
are more proximate to us... (1990/2002, p. 498)

And here modern, electronic communications help us
in yet another way to understand what is going on with
texts. The sense of immediacy of electronics gives
readers a sense of proximity to events reported. That,
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too, occurs with texts. With a text that works well,
readers enter into the text, “into the immediacy of the
writer’s experience” (p. 499). But electronic communication also reveals that this immediacy is highly mediated, and thus somewhat artificial.

Speeding up communication serves to decrease
distance and to increase the immediacy and thus the
person-to-person quality of communication. Understanding the digital codes and electronic speeds
helps us to understand better what happens with
texts (and what was happening all along, though we
did not notice).

The artificial means of storing information in turn
began to affect the ways that people think and live (pp.
14-15). Having the tool available means using it.
The process took time, though. “Originally, writing was not so much a ‘communication’ device
(involving interchange between two conscious persons)—although it was this to some extent—as it was a
simple ‘information’ system (a coding system),
although it was not entirely this either” (p. 19). Ong
admits that the process from pre-writing to writing is a
complex one; it involved not only the development of
an efficient tool like alphabetic writing, but also the
mindset to use the tool. Just as the history of rhetoric
tells the story of evolving human thought, so too does
the story of writing. For writing to work, humans needed to adjust psychologically.
The contemporary information processing model
shows us more clearly that pre-writing storage systems
work as information storage. They also illustrate how
any text works—by deferring or interrupting dialogue.

B. Writing

C. Interpretation

From the perspective of code, we also understand
writing systems better. “Recent findings have made it
possible to see an intriguing relationship between
developments leading into writing in its very earliest
form and our only recently devised writing with the
digital computer” (Ong, 1998, p. 4). Reviewing the
work of Denise Schmandt-Besserat (1992), Ong recognizes that the coding for numbers used in Sumerian
pre-pictographic writing has affinities with the digital
storage of information—that information storage
underlies writing. Such an information storage system
arises only in “the larger human context, social, economic, technological, and other” (Ong, 1998, p. 10).
Human communication is decidedly oral and humans
have developed technologies to preserve and sharpen
that communication—from memory systems to artificial information storage systems. These grow out of the
human life world.

The abundance of information resulting from all
of our information storage systems does not become
immediately intelligible. It requires interpretation. But,
as with most things Ong explores, a study of the interpretation of stored information tells us about more than
itself, tells us in this instance about an on-going need
for interpretation in all communication.
“In a quite ordinary and straightforward sense, to
interpret means for a human being to bring out for
another human being or for other human beings (or for
himself or herself) what is concealed in a given manifestation, that is, what is concealed in a verbal statement or a given phenomenon or state of affairs providing information” (Ong, 1995/1999, p. 183). No communication is complete because one can always say
more: dialogue continues; texts require contexts; discourse needs commentary; and so on. Language itself
allows this complexity and commentary in its very
structures of syntax and referentiality (p. 185). It, like
all communication is not a closed system.
To examine one communication form or medium,
as we have seen, shows us how it has transformed what
preceded it. And so the awareness of the need to interpret texts casts light on what happens in conversation.

A paradox is at work here, as always when we
are dealing with the application of technologies
to the word, from writing onward. Electricity
means generators, machinery, and mechanical
equipment. It interposed a great deal that is not
directly human between the written verbalization of reporters . . . [and readers]. (p. 503)

Given that writing is a technological product
storing knowledge outside the human individual
and thus encouraging a sense of the known as
separate from the knower, it appears to be no
accident that the prehistory of writing begins
with enumeration of visible, material commodities, object-things seen and/or felt as distinct
from human thinkers and verbalizers, such as
Schmandt-Besserat finds in the commodities
with which the Near East tokens deal. (p. 19)
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Besides being complex and supple, verbal interpretation is curiously self-propagating. For if, as
has been seen, more than other sorts of interpretation (gesticular, and so on), verbalized inter-
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pretation moves toward maximized interpretation, it is at the same time never totally maximized, never totally completed and thus by its
very existence invites further asymptotic movement toward completion. (p. 187)

The need for interpretation stems from the nature of
communication. The bringing of people together, the
mutual revelation of the interiority of individuals, can
never be perfect. But people try.
Texts complicate the situation because texts cannot explain what lies beyond the text. Ong traces the
history of hermeneutics as a science of interpreting
texts. Handwritten texts more urgently than face-toface communication required interpretation because
here people first experienced the absence of the author,
the absence of the kind of dialogue to which they had
been accustomed. Centuries later, “with the deep interiorization of print . . . hermeneutics as a self-conscious, more or less systematized activity comes into
its own” (p. 196). But digital communication, Ong
argues, really makes us aware of the need for
hermeneutics, since digitization radically separates
information from communication. Asking why this
happens now, Ong answers, “One reason that suggests
itself is that electronic communication has made us into
an information society, and information of itself says
nothing unless it is interpreted or treated hermeneutically” (p. 197). But there is more than this. Information
storage systems themselves call attention to the fact
they depend on encoding and decoding outside of
themselves. They rely as much on a social structure as

they do on a technological one. And that, Ong reminds
us, fairly defines the hermeneutical circle (p. 197).
But, then, all communication depends on social
structures. And therefore all communication requires
interpretation. “Hermeneutic or explanation stops not
when there is nothing left to be explained but when, for
present purposes, in this given existential situation,
nothing further is felt to be necessary” (p. 199). Such
communication inevitably goes beyond propositions
and logic; but the history of rhetoric and dialectic and
the history of visualism and visual representations of
knowledge in the West sometimes mislead us. Ong
returns to sound: sound reveals the interior. The social
structures of all human life presume those interiors.
The process of interpretation summarizes much
of Ong’s explorations and conclusions about communication.
Since each “I” must sense the “you” whom the
“I” addresses before speech begins, dialogue
demands, paradoxically enough, that the persons
addressing one another be somehow aware of
the interior of each other before they can begin
to communicate verbally. . . . In verbal communication, the hearer must be aware that the
speaker intends the utterance to be a word or
words and not just noise; the speaker must know
that the hearer knows this, and the hearer must
know that the speaker knows that he or she (the
hearer) knows it. The hermeneutical circle again.
We are somehow inside one another’s consciousness before we begin to speak to another
or others. (p. 203)

Conclusion
If these five areas—the history of rhetoric, the
exploration of visualism, the understanding of the
word, the delineation of the stages of communication,
the situating of hermeneutics—were all that Ong had
done, his work would have a significant impact on
communication study. But there is more, more than we
can review here. Ong also carefully observed culture,
particularly in literature and education, but in other
areas as well. Gronbeck (1991) argues that Ong represents an important strand in an American cultural studies tradition, a conclusion echoed by Farrell (2000).
Gronbeck argues that this cultural studies tradition differs from others:
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Distinctively American with its unusual grounding in classics, religious hermeneutics, the philosophy of sociology, and anthropology, this
school of communication studies stands counterpoised to its Continental and British sisters. It
has affinities with French semiotics and structuralism, and the breadth of its generalizations
gives it the feeling of writings from the
Frankfurt school, yet cultural studies in America
is its own creature. (Gronbeck, 1991, p. 9)

It is in this tradition that Ong provides communication
studies more broadly conceived with both a stance
towards culture and a methodology to explore it.
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Gronbeck identifies four key questions that characterize Ong’s approach. “What are the distinguishing
features of media of communication, broadly understood?” (p. 11). “What are the psychodynamics of selfhood? If British and European cultural studies turn outward to matters of social structure and political-economic power when contemplating communication
processes . . . Americans often turn inward to trace the
consequences of mediation processes for the individual
self” (p. 12). The third area of Ong’s questioning that
Gronbeck identifies focuses on the relationship
between culture and life world, while the fourth calls
attention to “the implications of the interactions of
mediation, consciousness, and culture for various
facets of human existence” (p. 13).
Within all of his explorations of these interactions, the human interaction matters most for Ong: the
personal, the interior. All the technological systems
humans create—memory systems, rhetoric, dialectic,
writing, printing, electronics—ultimately serve this
interaction.
Ong’s explorations remind us, too, that the technological systems of communication have their own
effects. Humans adapt to them in ways that we do not
often recognize. Each time he looked at communication he discovered more of these psychological adjustments as well as a resistance to change. Ramus’s texts,
with their visual aids, revealed something about rhetoric. Early printed texts showed an oral residue.

Electronic communication absolutely depends on
printed texts but also introduces a new orality into
human life. Digital information systems reveal that all
the prior communication media also function as information systems.
The need to interpret all this brings us back again
to the human interactions—the manifestation of interiority—that began it all.
Though not formally a communication scholar,
Ong has contributed mightily to communication studies in four ways. First, as a cultural historian exploring
rhetoric, he has called attention to the link between
mental processes and communication tools. Second, in
his recognition of the visualism promoted by printed
texts, he reminds us of the role of the sensorium in all
communication. Third, through his proposal that we
think of the modes of communication (primary oral, literate, secondary oral) as stages building on one another, he has helped to identify the extraordinary complexity of human communication and provided an
hypothesis to guide further exploration. And, fourth, by
his insistence on the living word, he has kept the
human at the center of all communication, reinforcing
the link between the interpersonal and any other kind
of mediated communication.
If all of this seems natural to us today, we should
credit Ong for introducing so much, in such detail and
clarity, as to make it seem readily apparent and so
much a matter of common sense.

Editor’s Afterword
W. E. Biernatzki, S.J.

Father Walter Ong, S.J., was widely known and
highly regarded in academic circles. Those who knew
him personally saw a different, but related side of his
personality: a seeker of knowledge at all levels, interested in the world, eager to know its many facets. In his
youth, as an Eagle Scout, he had to earn many merit
badges, an accomplishment that both appealed to his
inquiring nature and introduced him to a wide range of
diverse subjects, both practical and theoretical.
That thirst for knowledge of all sorts carried over
into both his intellectual life and his day-to-day interests and recreations. He was quick to join conversa-
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tions on whatever topics his companions might introduce, from fly fishing, to psychoanalysis, to linguistic
philosophy, or space travel. Often, he knew the topic so
well that other parties to the conversation could only sit
back and absorb his contributions. At the same time, he
was genuinely interested in others’ work and their
ideas, listening patiently, then injecting his own perspectives on the subject.
Ong, the polymath, was thus well-equipped from
the start to explore the hidden nooks and crannies of
western intellectual history, and not only to bring into the
light unexpected treasures but also to relate them to the

VOLUME 23 (2004) NO. 1 — 21

vast, complex and ever-evolving chart of reality being
drawn by both modern sciences and humanistic studies.
Walter was interested in the work of the Centre
for the Study of Communication and Culture and in
this journal, Communication Research Trends, from
their very inception, in the 1970s. He recognized that
the focus of the Centre and the journal coincided closely with his own preoccupation with the nature of information and communication and their developing role in
the modern world. He contributed the major contents of
two issues of the journal, articles on “Information
and/or Communication” (1996), and “Digitization
Ancient and Modern: Beginnings of Writing and
Today’s Computers” (1998).
At the same time, he was a Jesuit, a vowed religious, deeply embedded in the matrix of Catholic
Christianity. This embedding doubtless contributed
greatly to his ability to draw out the meanings implicit
in his insights and to relate them into a big picture. The
unbroken current of Judeo-Christian history, running
through the broader stream of Western intellectual history, was available to him not merely as a problematically abstract framework but as meaningful to every
level of his life. He spent most of his life in a Jesuit university faculty community, with a variety of “men
astutely trained,” sharing a common set of religious
and moral values, but often able to argue vigorously for
a wide range of individual interpretations from many
perspectives. The effects of that intellectual environment on Walter would be impossible to analyze with
scientific precision, but it had to be significant.
Walter had a notable effect on all who knew him
well, but probably on none more than his students.
These are scattered far and wide, not only in America
but in many countries around the world. Many were
impressed not only by the “bare bones” of his theorizing but also by his interest in their own languages and
cultures, bringing the theories alive to them through his
questions about their own ways of knowing and communicating. That questioning was no mere pedagogical
gimmick, either, but it was evident that he was continually learning from their answers. His willingness to
learn while teaching was, in itself, a valuable lesson, an
opening for the students into an ever-expandable universe ripe for their own future exploration.
His insights and ideas broke new pathways for
understanding how we think and communicate. But
there remains unexplored territory beyond the ends of
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those paths. The best imaginable tribute to his learning
and his memory would be for those who knew him and
learned from him to push on with the explorations.
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